

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DETERIORATION OF MATERIAL  
CONDITIONS ABOARD USS HAWES (FFG 53), WHICH WAS  
DISCOVERED ON 08 JANUARY 2010

### Preliminary Statement

1. Upon completion of the Pre-ULTRA Material Visit, serious concerns were noted about the material condition of both 1A&1B Main Engines. Additionally, several basic engineering programs were found to be non-existent. By enclosure (1), CCSG-10 directed this investigation into the current condition of HAWES and any circumstances that may have lead to or could have prevented this condition from progressing. I collected all information from 2008-2009 to get an accurate picture of HAWES, her ISIC and all factors which may have identified any issues and to attempt to determine the causal events that led to this condition. Of note, the inspections identified issues within the Engineering department and Command; however, no significant material damage or personnel injuries occurred. All issues identified are within Ship's Force capability to repair and resolve. Additionally, the entire leadership of the ship has turned over and all personnel are enthusiastic and energetic in solving these issues.
2. I received legal advice from the CCSG-10 JAG, (b) (6) and clerical assistance from (b) (6).

### Findings of Fact

1. HAWES entered the Basic Phase in early 2008 prior to entering SRA. She satisfactorily completed her engineering certification during ULTRA-E, a significant accomplishment; however, the adjective grade assigned was AVERAGE. [encls (2), (6)]
2. COMDESRON 26 was deployed through the first half of 2008. ISIC representation and supervision for HAWES was provided by a sister DESRON. [encl (3)]
3. Pre-SRA Engine inspections were accomplished by Rolls-Royce in March 2008 with no major issues noted. [encl (7)]
4. 3M Certification was accomplished in March 2008. 3 of 6 areas required re-certification. The re-certification was originally scheduled for November; however, the operational schedule required a delay to February. [encl (2), (8)]
5. (b) (6) assumed command during the SRA in April. [encl (2)]
6. (b) (6) is sent to Marine Gas Turbine Inspector (MGTI) School during the summer of 2008. He is subsequently dropped from the school for poor performance and failure to attend class. He remains aboard as the billeted Top Snipe. [encl (34), (37)]
7. 3M LTT was conducted to train ship personnel in resolving issues identified in the 3M Certification. [encl (9)]
8. HAWES was operational for almost all of July, August, September, October and November 2008, conducting OPFOR duties, Joint Warrior Group Sail, Joint Warrior and Baltic Operations. [encl (2)]

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9. (b) (6) reported as CHENG in August 2008. [encl (4)]
10. Pre-deployment Inspection of 1A&1B engines was conducted in January 2009. This inspection identified indications of salt buildup in both engines and recommended internal (R-1) and external (Q-1R) water washes to be conducted. A review of Quarterly boards and tagout records indicate the required maintenance was completed. Additionally, it specifically singled out that the intakes were well kept and that the crew took pride in their spaces. [encls (10), (23), (24), (25)]
11. An ULTRA-S was conducted in February 2009. As this was just prior to POM and Deployment, the ship used the watch teams that would be deploying. The teams did poorly; however, under the SFTM rules at the time, since ATG scores were commensurate with the Ship's ETT scores, the ship was not required to recertify nor receive additional training. Additionally, the Tagout Program was specifically identified as being Not Effective. [encl (11)]
12. COMDESRON 26 was focusing on JAMES E WILLIAMS SMC and KAUFFMAN SMC. Additionally, they were executing ISIC duties for 9 ships and beginning the Strike Group Workup Cycle. [encls (3), (39)]
13. 3M recertification was conducted in February 2009 and HAWES recertified in all 6 areas. [encl (12)]
14. ESOMS Electronic Tagout Program is installed during March 2009 with minimal training provided to the ships crew. [encls (32), (34)]
15. A new CSO (b) (6) reported in February 2009. A new OPS (b) (6) reported in March 2009. [encl (4)]
16. The XO (b) (6) was reassigned due to humanitarian reasons in March 2009. (b) (6) assumed duties as XO until an interim fill could be identified. (b) (6) reported aboard in April as the interim XO. He is an XO/CO Fleet-Up qualified officer and was assigned for approximately 5 months through the deployment. [encl (4)]
17. HAWES deployed in April 2009. [encl (2)]
18. COMDESRON 26 N4 (b) (6) and N8 (b) (6) were deployed to 1 year IA billets in April 2009. [encl (5)]
19. In May 2009, the XO (b) (6) disestablishes the Ships Training Program and requires all training issues and scheduling items to be approved by him alone. [encl (33)]
20. Quarterly 3M Training was conducted by the Mayport 3M Team in June 2009. [encl (13)]
21. At the end of August 2009, both the OPS Officer and CSO resign and are Detached for Cause. [encl (4)]
22. (b) (6) is sent to HAWES to investigate the Command Climate aboard the ship. He reports a poisoned atmosphere specifically caused by the friction apparent at all levels of the command between the CO, XO and the previous OPS Officer and CSO. There is no such friction between the XO and (b) (6) and (b) (6)

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- (b) (6) is reassigned as CSO, while a Junior Officer (b) (6) is assigned as interim Chief Engineer. [encls (4), (14)]
23. Upon the return of OPS and CSO to Norfolk, COMDESRON 26 interviews them and they affirm (b) (6)'s report that the CO was performing well and the XO and their personal failings combined to lead them to resign. [encl (40)]
24. In early October 2009, on the way home from deployment, Mayport Gas Turbine Inspectors identify faulty conditions on 1B Main Engine that necessitate an inspection on return to homeport. These conditions are similar to the conditions found in the pre-deployment inspection. [encls (10), (15)]
25. The new XO (b) (6) arrives in October to assume duties. HAWES enters Post Deployment Stand-Down. [encls (3), (4)]
26. The engine history report indicates Norfolk MARMC made necessary repairs to 1B engine and conducted a satisfactory optest. [encl (16)]
27. Shipboard Team Training visit was conducted in November 2009. HAWES continues to struggle with the Tagout Program and the report specifically identifies the absence of a Ship's Training Program. [encl (17)]
28. Quarterly 3M Admin Review is conducted in November 2009. Several discrepancies were identified; however, all were within ship's force capability to resolve. [encl (18)]
29. HAWES continues to be operational during November and December 2009 conducting SCC Operations and SEASWITI exercises. [encl (2)]
30. Change of Command was conducted in December 2009. [encl (2)]
31. Pre-ULTRA Material Visit is conducted in January 2010. HAWES is not prepared for the visit and numerous problems are noted. Specifically, the TAGOUT, Training and PQS Programs are in need of direct attention. Additionally, cleanliness issues in the engineering spaces and visual inspections of the main engines require immediate attention. This visit alone generates approximately 25 CASREPs. [encl (19), (31)]
32. NNSY conducts a complete inspection of 1A main engine. They place it in a Repair Before Operate condition and provide a list of maintenance actions required to be completed before re-inspection and optest. All maintenance actions are within Ships Force Capability to conduct. [encls (20), (21)]
33. Upon review of NAVSEA Weblog data of engine hours, it is noted that both engines are overdue for required inspections. The GTB24 inspection is required every 3000 hours +/- 500 hours and both engines are approximately 745 hours over. Based on engine operating hours, the engines should have been inspected upon RTHP from deployment. [encls (10), (26), (27), (28)]
34. Upon Review of PMS Boards and Tagout Records, both external and internal water washes were conducted and recorded at required intervals. Although there are not specific tagout records for the Q-1R, it is feasible that they were conducted in conjunction with the

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R-1. Missing from the PMS records, though, are the R-12, R-16, R-17, and R-22 which would have identified and prevented the issues identified in the Material inspections. Tagout records do exist that indicate these checks were done; however, dates are not indicated and they were not recorded properly on the Quarterly boards. [encl (22), (23), (24), (25)]

35. The ship conducted very little training through the operational phase of their schedule. The bare minimum of training was allowed to qualify watchstanders; however, watchstander proficiency was not a priority during underway operations. [encl (29), (30), (32), (33), (34), (36)]

36. HAWES averaged less than 5 CASREPs per month while on deployment, well below the FFG average. Within 2 months of the Change of Command, 35 CASREPs were submitted. [encl (31)]

#### Opinions

1. Although, HAWES started her Basic Phase on a high note, certifying at ULTRA-E, there were indications that she was at best an AVERAGE ship. [FF (1), (3)]

2. Throughout her Basic Phase, she struggled with her programs and did not have the benefit of detailed ISIC oversight as COMDESRON 26 was deployed at the time. [FF (2), (4), (7)]

3. HAWES met all tasked Operational commitments for nearly 18 consecutive months. Additionally, she operated in very demanding conditions. [FF (8), (10), (17), (29)]

4. The salt buildup in the engines identified in January 2009 are the first indication of deteriorating conditions of the engines. This buildup was likely caused by the adverse conditions of the North Atlantic and Atlantic transit conducted during the winter of 2008. [FF (8), (10)]

5. The poor showing in the February 2009 ULTRA-S should have raised flags with COMDESRON 26 Staff; however, their focus had shifted to 2 ships that were doing poorly at SMC and with 9 ships to oversee, relied on the HAWES leadership to resolve their own issues during POM and deployment. [FF (11), (12), (13), (17)]

6. HAWES leadership was then dealt a crushing blow in February and March 2009, 2 out of 3 Department Heads turned over and the XO was transferred for Humanitarian reasons. (b) (6) reported aboard as XO in April on deployment. [FF (15), (16), (17)]

7. The immediate friction between the XO, CO and Department Heads is transparent to all personnel onboard the ship and causes serious problems. The XO cancels the Shipboard Training instruction and makes it so hard for everyone to schedule and conduct training that it takes a back seat to accomplishing the mission at all costs. The

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XO does not get along with OPS and CSO and makes their lives so  
difficult that they resign. [FF (21), (22), (23), (25), (35)]

8. After the CHENG gets reassigned to CSO, a Junior Officer must  
assume duties as CHENG. As hard as it is to conduct and schedule  
training, it is just as hard to conduct required maintenance on the  
engines. It is difficult to get the time and permission to take the  
engines offline to perform maintenance due to the ships high optempo  
and tasking. Based on Tagout records and PMS records, the crew was  
clearly conducting all maintenance; however, based on visual  
observation of the engines, it appears that due diligence was not  
performed in ensuring that the maintenance checks were accomplished  
to the maximum extent required to maintain the engines properly. [FF  
(22), (34), (35), (36)]

Recommendations

(b) (5)

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(b) (5)



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


(b) (5)



In closing, I found no indications of wanton dereliction of duty. HAWES is a ship with minimal manning that operated for 16 out of 18 months, continuously and met all assigned tasking. There is an entirely new leadership team aboard HAWES. All of the above issues are within their ability to fix and to establish an outstanding command. They have all of the tools onboard to re-establish all of the required basic programs. There are no systemic Navy problems that allowed these conditions to happen, just a perfect storm of leadership turnover and operational requirements that caused the command to lose focus on more than just the immediate mission at hand. Recent improvements by Surface Leadership (Change 2 to the SFTM, Back to Basics, SOSMRC, etc) will go a long way to ensure that all ships maintain their readiness to maximum efficiency. In HAWES' case, continued focus by the ship, DESRON, ATG and CNSL will produce another Warship Ready for Tasking.

(b) (6)



CC: USS HAWES  
COMDESRON 26  
COMNAVSURFLANT

23 May 2011

Commander  
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet  
1430 Mitscher Ave  
Norfolk, VA 23551-2494

Dear FOIA Coordinator,

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  
I request that a copy of the following document(s) be provided to me:  
Command Investigation into the material condition of USS HAWES (FFG 53)  
conducted on or about December 2009 by Commander, Destroyer Squadron 26.

In order to help you determine my status for the purpose of assessing fees, you should know that I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for a commercial use. If available electronically, I prefer to receive the documents in that format. I will gladly provide either a return mail envelope and DVD-R if emailing the files is not possible. If not available electronically, I am willing to pay fees up to \$10 related to the reproduction and mailing of the reports.

I also include a telephone number and email address at which I can be contacted if necessary to discuss any aspect of my request.



Sincerely,  
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